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I. Introduction'
IN RECENT YEARS, there has been a marked expansion in the types
of uses, both commercial and nonprofit, that challenge land-use
regulations on First Amendment grounds. This expansion is occurring
for two reasons. First, "land use and the first amendment" is a
developing area in the law; it has been only fifteen years since the
Supreme Court first ruled on a case "in which the interests in free
expression protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments have
been implicated by a municipality's commercial zoning ordinance."
2
While the Court has addressed zoning controls on adult businesses,3
1. Professor Weinstein prepared Sections I through V of the Subcommittee Re-
port. Professor Zeigler and Kathryn Huseman, a second year law student at the Univer-
sity of Denver, prepared Section VI of the Subcommittee Report.
2. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (upholding Detroit's "anti skid row" ordinance that required the dispersion
of adult entertainment businesses).
3. In addition to Young, the Court has considered three further challenges to adult
zoning ordinances: FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990) (striking
down the licensing provisions of a comprehensive adult entertainment zoning and
licensing ordinance); City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)
(upholding a "concentration" ordinance that limited adult businesses to a 520-acre area
comprising approximately 5 % of the city); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61 (1981) (striking down a prohibition on all live entertainment).
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signs and billboards,4 and newsracks,5 it has not yet decided a case
involving a challenge to zoning or historic preservation ordinances
based on the religion clauses of the First Amendment.6 The first
federal appeals court decisions in such cases came only in 1983
(zoning)7 and 1990 (historic preservation) .8 As is typical of developing
areas in the law, litigants are encouraged to bring cases because the
law is unsettled and they hope to create significant new rights.
Second, a number of societal factors have coalesced to create a greater
potential for conflict when government regulates the use of land. In
part, this is occurring simply because we are an increasingly diverse
society. Consider, for example, a recent Fifth Circuit case, 9 involving
a mosque in Mississippi, which illustrates one aspect of our increasing
diversity: the recent appearance in communities across the nation of
all sizes of religious groups-such as Muslims, Mormons, Seventh
Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Hasidic Jews-that have
4. In two cases involving free speech challenges to zoning controls on signs and
billboards, the Court ruled that content-neutral controls that do not favor commercial
over noncommercial expression and which advance legitimate governmental interests
in aesthetics and traffic safety are valid. See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
490 (1981).
5. In City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988),
the Court struck down a municipal ordinance that limited newspaper vending machines
(newsracks) to locations on public property in commercial districts, and established
licensing, design-review, and insurance requirements. However, since the case in-
volved a facial challenge to the regulations and the Court, after finding that the ordinance
impermissibly gave the mayor unfettered discretion to deny or condition a permit,
remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit to decide whether the unconstitutional provisions
could be severed. The ruling provides no guidance on whether the locational, licensing
fee, and insurance requirements pass constitutional muster.
6. The First Amendment contains two separate guarantees of religious freedom:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; .... "Both the "Establishment" and "Free Exercise" Clauses
have been made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause).
7. See Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983); Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d
729 (11th Cir. 1983).
8. Rector of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914
F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
9. See Islamic Ctr. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1988), which
held that the Board of Aldermen of Starkville, Mississippi, violated the Free Exercise
Clause when it denied a special exception to a group of Muslim students at Mississippi
State University who sought to renovate a property for use as a student residence and
mosque. Id. at 294. The court concluded that the board had denied the Islamic Center
a special exception for reasons other than the asserted considerations of traffic control
and public safety and that it applied different standards to approving a mosque than it
had adopted for Christian institutions. Id. at 302.
660 FALL 1991
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not traditionally been in the mainstream of American religious life.
Another, and very different, example of increasing social diversity has
been the spread of "adult businesses," which once were limited to the
"red light" districts of large cities, and to the neighborhoods and central
business districts of large and small communities alike.
Other factors besides increasing social diversity have given rise to
increased conflict between land-use controls and the First Amendment.
The near universal acceptance of aesthetics as a valid governmental
objective in the past two decades has led to greater local efforts to
control signs. The adoption of local historic preservation ordinances
can create conflict because many of the significant historical structures
in any community will be churches and synagogues. Finally, the in-
creasingly litigious nature of society generally also contributes to the
growing conflict.
In this report, we review a number of significant state and federal
cases in each of the areas noted above: regulation of newsracks; the
application of zoning, eminent domain, and historic preservation ordi-
nances to religious institutions; sign controls; and zoning regulation of
adult businesses. We first discuss the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Barnes v. Glen Theatre'° which, although not a land-use case, has
significant implications for the manner in which local governments
choose to regulate adult businesses.
H. Barnes v. Glen Theatre
Barnes v. Glen Theatre involved First Amendment challenges by two
adult businesses in South Bend, Indiana, to the enforcement of Indiana's
public indecency statute which barred totally nude dancing. ' One is the
Kitty Kat Lounge, a bar that presents "go-go dancing," and would like
to present totally nude dancing, but the Indiana law regulating public
nudity requires that dancers wear "pasties" and a "G-string."12 The
other, the Glen Theatre, is an adult business that offers books, maga-
zines, movie showings, and live entertainment, consisting of nude and
10. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
11. Id. at 2458.
12. The Indiana statute declares that anyone who knowingly or intentionally ap-
pears in a state of nudity in a public place commits "public indecency," a Class A
misdemeanor. "Nudity" is defined as "the showing of the human male or female
genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing
of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple,
or the showing of the covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state." IND. CODE
§ 35-45-4-1 (1988).
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semi-nude female dancers, in an enclosed "bookstore.' ' 3 After a
lengthy journey through the federal courts, 14 a majority of the Seventh
Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded that non-obscene nude dancing per-
formed for entertainment is expression protected by the First Amend-
ment, and that the public indecency statute was an improper infringe-
ment of that expressive activity because its purpose was to prevent the
message of eroticism and sexuality conveyed by the dancers."
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, ' 6
but failed to reach a single rationale for its decision.' 7 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, delivered the
opinion of the Court upholding the statute, with Justices Scalia and
Souter writing separate concurring opinions. Justice White, joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented.
Rehnquist's opinion acknowledged that nude dancing is expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment, but found that it was only
"marginally" within the amendment's "outer perimeters. ' ' 8
Rehnquist argued that the statute was not aimed at the erotic message
conveyed by the dancing but sought to ban all public nudity, whether
or not it is combined with expressive activity. '9 Thus, the correct way
to view the statute was as a form of "time, place or manner" restriction
13. Barnes, Ill S. Ct. at 2459.
14. See Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1986); Glen Theatre,
Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ind. 1988); Miller v. Civil
City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1989).
15. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990).
16. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463.
17. In its decisions involving land use and the First Amendment, the Court has
twice been fragmented when it initially considered a particular issue, but formed a
consensus on a later case. In 1976, the Court split 4-1-4 in Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), its first adult zoning case, but a decade later upheld
the ordinance in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), with
a 6-3 split. Similarly, the Court's first sign regulation decision in Metromedia, Inc.
v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), split 4-2-1-1-1: a plurality opinion by
Justice White, joined by three others; a concurring opinion by Justice Brennan, joined
by Justice Blackmun; and three separate dissenting opinions. Three years later, in
Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), there
was a six-member majority that upheld the ordinance in question.
The Court appeared to follow this pattern again last term in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City
of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990). In ruling for the first time on whether the licensing
provisions of a comprehensive adult business ordinance constituted a prior restraint,
the six-Justice majority, while striking down the licensing provision (id. at 606), split
down the middle on the issue of what procedural safeguards would be required to
salvage the scheme and the three dissenting Justices wrote two opinions. See id. at 616
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
19. Id.
FALL 1991
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which could be judged under the standards set forth in United States v.
O'Brien.20
After finding that Indiana's "public indecency" statute used the
state's police power to further a substantial government interest in
protecting order and morality by banning public nudity, 2' Rehnquist
argued that restricting nudity on moral grounds is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, relying on language in O'Brien rejecting
an "expansive" notion of expression as any conduct intended to express
an idea.22 Rehnquist denied the contention that, while the statute's gen-
eral prohibition on public nudity may be unrelated to suppressing free
expression, the state, by banning nude dancing, seeks to prevent its
erotic message. He argued that the state was not proscribing nudity
because of the erotic message but was only "making the message
slightly less graphic" by requiring dancers to wear pasties and
G-strings, thereby addressing the evil it sought to prevent-public nu-
dity. 23 It was not the dancing, with its communicative element, which
the state prohibited, but public nudity, whether or not it is combined
with expressive activity.24 Finally, and no doubt with tongue in cheek,
20. Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). Rehnquist noted
that while the "time, place or manner" test was developed for evaluating restrictions
on expression taking place on public property used as a "public forum," the Court in
Renton had applied it to conduct occurring on private property (id.); and then observed
"that this test has been interpreted to embody much the same standards as those set
forth in United States v. O'Brien." Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968)).
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), which "held that when 'speech'
and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify inciden-
tal limitations on First Amendment freedoms" (id. at 376), stated a four-part test for
evaluating government regulations that incidentally affect expressive activity:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377.
21. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462.
22. Id. at 2462-63. Rehnquist also cited City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19
(1989), in which the Court held that social "ballroom" dancing was beyond the protec-
tion of the First Amendment, for the proposition that one could find some "kernel"
of expression in almost every activity, "but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the
activity within the protection of the First Amendment." Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25.
However, Justice White's dissenting opinion correctly observes that Stanglin did not
address the issue of whether social dancing was expressive activity, but rather, whether
plaintiff's associational rights were violated by restricting admission to dance halls on
the basis of age. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2471 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 2463.
24. Id.
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Rehnquist found that the public indecency statute was narrowly tailored
to achieve its end, since the requirement that dancers wear at least
pasties and a G-string was the "bare minimum" necessary to achieve
the state's purpose.25
Justices Scalia and Souter concurred in the judgment of the Court
upholding the Indiana statute, but wrote separate concurring opinions
to state their differing views on the reasons why it should be upheld.
Scalia, who viewed the public indecency law as a general law regulating
conduct and not specifically directed at expression, argued that the
statute should not be subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all.26
Justice Souter provided a cautious fifth vote. While he agreed with
both the plurality and dissent that the nude dancing at issue in this case
is subject to a degree of First Amendment protection,27 and agreed with
the plurality's use of the O'Brien test,28 he wrote separately because he
viewed the justification for the statute to be not public morality, the
position taken by both the plurality and Justice Scalia, but the substantial
governmental interest in combating the secondary effects of adult enter-
tainment establishments that offer nude dancing.29 Viewed thus, his
25. Id.
26. Scalia placed the Indiana statute "in the line of a long tradition of laws against
public nudity, which have never been thought to run afoul of [our] traditional under-
standing of the freedom of speech." Id. at 2464. Noting that "virtually every law
restricts conduct, and virtually any prohibited conduct can be performed for an expres-
sive purpose-if only expressive of the fact that the actor disagrees with the prohibition"
(id. at 2465)-Scalia dismissed the idea "that every restriction of expression inciden-
tally produced by a general law regulating conduct pass normal First Amendment
scrutiny" (id.) or be justified by an important or substantial government interest:
where a judicial inquiry shows that the purpose of the law is not to suppress communica-
tion, then "that is the end of the matter so far as First Amendment guarantees are
concerned." Id. at 2467.
Scalia found support for this position in last Term's decision on the Free Exercise
Clause, Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990)
(holding that general laws not specifically targeted at religious practices do not require
heightened First Amendment scrutiny even though they diminish some people's ability
to practice their religion). In fact, he found even greater reason to apply this approach
to the regulation of expressive conduct since
relatively few can plausibly assert that their illegal conduct is being engaged in for
religious reasons; but almost anyone can violate almost any law as a means of
expression. In the one case, as in the other, if the law is not directed against the
protected value (religion or expression) the law must be obeyed.
Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2467.
We note, however, that the majority view in Smith has been the subject of intense
criticism, see, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990). But see William P. Marshall, In Defense
of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991).
27. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463.
28. Id. at 2468-69.
29. Id.
FALL 1991
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analysis under the O'Brien test found support in the Young and Renton
decisions which upheld zoning restrictions on the location of adult
businesses in order to control their secondary effects.3°
The fact that Justice Souter's concurring opinion relies on a secondary
effects justification for the statute is an extremely important point of
departure from the Rehnquist and Scalia opinions, which rely on public
morality to justify the enactment, because his opinion confines public
decency laws, as applied to nudity in the performing arts, to the single
context of adult entertainment absent evidence of secondary effects.31
The four dissenters, in an opinion authored by Justice White, argued
that the statute served different purposes when applied to ban nudity in
such public places as beaches and parks than when applied to ban nude
dancing in adult establishments.32 In the former case, the purpose is to
protect the public from offense.3 3 In the latter case, since the viewers
are adults who have willingly paid to be in attendance, the purpose is
to protect the viewers from what the state believes is the harmful mes-
sage that nude dancing communicates. 34 Thus, in White's view,
Rehnquist's argument that the state is not "prohibiting nudity because
of the erotic message conveyed by the dancers" but only because of the
nudity, is "transparently erroneous" because the nudity is itself an
expressive component of the dance, not merely incidental "conduct." 35
Since the statute directly regulates expressive activity, White argued,
it may only be justified by a compelling state interest that is narrowly
30. Id. at 2469-70.
31. Souter observed:
It is difficult to see, for example, how the enforcement of Indiana's statute against
nudity in a production of "Hair" or "Equus" somewhere other than an "adult"
theater would further the state's interest in avoiding harmful secondary effects, in
the absence of evidence that expressive activity outside the context of Renton-type
adult entertainment was correlated with such secondary effects."
Id. at 2470 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring).
32. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2473 (White, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2473-74.
It is only because nude dancing performances may generate emotions and feelings
of eroticism and sensuality among the spectators that the State seeks to regulate such
expressive activity, apparently on the assumption that creating or emphasizing such
thoughts and ideas in the minds of spectators may lead to increased prostitution and
the degradation of women. But generating thoughts, ideas, and emotions is the
essence of communication. The nudity element of nude dancing cannot be neatly
pigeonholed as mere "conduct" independent of any expressive component of the
dance.
Id. at 2474 (footnote omitted).
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drawn.3 6 But rather than narrowly tailoring a statute to address prostitu-
tion and associated evils, 37 or using its authority under the Twenty-First
Amendment to regulate nude dancing in bars,38 Indiana impermissibly
chose to ban an entire category of expressive activity.
Barnes is an important case for several reasons. First, it exemplifies
the profound effect Justice Brennan's resignation, and the subsequent
appointment of Justice Souter, has had on the Court; there can be little
doubt that there would have been a majority to strike down the statute
were Brennan still on the Court.39 With the announcement of Justice
Marshall's retirement, and expected appointment of another conserva-
tive to the Court, there will soon be six potential votes on the Court to
support further incursions into areas of expression Justice Rehnquist
views as being on the "margin" of the First Amendment.
Second, the case has loosed a troika of sinister arguments into First
Amendment analysis, ranging from Scalia's denial that the statute is
directed at expression, 4° through Souter's secondary effects argument,41
to Rehnquist's notion of a hierarchy of noncommercial speech, with
nude dancing only "marginally" at the "outer perimeters" of First
Amendment protection.42 These views may well be applied to other
forms of expression viewed as being on the margins of the First Amend-
ment.43 By contrast, Justice White's position implicitly acknowledged
that all expression not judged to be wholly outside the First Amendment
should receive the full protection of its constitutional guarantees to
guard against "marginal" forms of expression, such as nude dancing,
being deemed unworthy by the courts or legislature. 44
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986); California v.
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
38. See Newport v. lacobucci, 479 U.S. 92 (1986) (per curiam); New York State
Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (per curiam); LaRue, 409 U.S. 109.
39. Justice Brennan argued strongly against government efforts to regulate expres-
sive activity as can be seen in his dissenting opinions in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); and City of Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463 (Scalia, J., concurring).
41. See id. at 2468-71 (Souter, J., concurring).
42. See id. at 2460 (Rehnquist, J.).
43. Rehnquist's view is reminiscent of that espoused by Justice Stevens' plurality
opinion in Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), where he justified
Detroit's differing treatment of adult and non-adult films by placing pornography on
a lower constitutional level than other forms of expression. See id. at 70-71.
44. That the performances in the Kitty Kat Lounge may not be high art, to say
the least, and may not appeal to the Court, is hardly an excuse for distorting
and ignoring settled [First Amendment] doctrine. In the words of Justice
Harlan, "it is largely because government officials cannot make principled
FALL 1991
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Third, the Court has given the green light to state and local govern-
ments to crack down on nude dancing, if they so choose, despite the
array of regulatory tools government already possesses to regulate adult
businesses.45 Further, state and local governments may now try to ban
other forms of erotic expression under the rationale advanced in Barnes.
Some observers, however, view the Court's ruling as a relatively
narrow one in the sense that it focused so particularly on nude dancing
in adult entertainment establishments and did not reach out to address
the First Amendment issues raised by an application of such statutes to
nudity in other forms of artistic expression. 46 Justice Souter specified
that his analysis would not apply to nudity in legitimate theater absent
evidence of secondary effects, and only Justice Scalia would deny any
constitutional protection to nude dancing. 47 Still, given the history of
decisions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so
largely to the individual."
Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2474 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971)).
45. These include: (1) locational restrictions based on Young and Renton; (2)
using nuisance statutes to close down adult businesses that foster prostitution, gambling,
or drug use (see, e.g., O'Connor v. City of Denver, 894 F.2d 1210 (10th Cir. 1990);
Hvamstad v. Suhler, 727 F. Supp. 511 (D. Minn. 1989)); (3) requiring owners or
operators of adult businesses to obtain a license, so long as such ordinances meet the
procedural safeguards set out in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990);
and (4) using the authority granted states under the Twenty-First Amendment to regu-
late the conditions under which the sale of alcoholic beverages occurs. See supra note
38. But see Bellanca v. New York State Liquor Auth., 429 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1981)
(holding that the state's police power, though possibly not limited under the U.S.
Constitution due to the Twenty-First Amendment, is limited by the protection of free
expression guaranteed by the state constitution); Harris v. Entertainment Sys., Inc.,
386 S.E.2d 140 (1989) (same). Contra Bellanca, 429 N.E.2d at 773-75 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
46. The New York Times reported that civil liberties lawyers, who feared that the
Court might "apply a sweeping analysis that could call into question constitutional
protections for many forms of artistic expression" were relieved by the Court's ap-
proach. N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1991, at 1 (national ed.).
47. This marks the second time that Justice Scalia has opined that sexually oriented
adult entertainment businesses should not receive the protection of the First Amend-
ment. In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City ofDallas, 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), he argued that while individual works of pornography
are always protected, businesses that specialize in pornography that is sexually explicit
in more than a minor degree are engaged in an activity, the "sordid business of
pandering" that is akin to obscenity, and are not constitutionally protected. Id. at 620.
Justice Scalia cited Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), as authority for
his position (see FWIPBS, 110 S. Ct. at 620), but Justice Stevens took issue with
this, contending that Ginzburg, which was decided before the Court extended First
Amendment protection to commercial speech, is no longer good law in light of the
Court's ruling in Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976). FW/PBS, 110 S. Ct. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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local governments' hostility toward adult businesses,48 we should not
be surprised by attempts to ban additional forms of pornography under
the rationale advanced in Barnes.
III. Zoning Regulation of Adult Businesses
Prior to this year's Barnes decision, the Supreme Court had ruled four
times on the constitutionality of municipal regulations governing the
location or operation of sexually oriented "adult businesses," begin-
ning with its Young decision in 1976. 49 These cases established that
municipalities could single out adult businesses for special regulatory
treatment in the form of "time, place, and manner" regulations that
restricted the locations where such businesses could operate, so long
as the municipality could show it had a substantial governmental interest
in regulating such businesses and the regulations still allowed for rea-
sonable alternative avenues of communication. 50 However, when cities
attempt to exclude all adult businesses, whether through an outright ban,
overly restrictive locational restrictions or by giving officials undue
discretion over special use or licensing provisions, the ordinance will
be struck down.51
Before turning to a discussion of recent cases that apply these rules,
there is an interesting 1989 decision of the California Supreme Court
48. See Alan C. Weinstein, The Renton Decision: A New Standard for Adult
Business Regulation, 32 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 91,98-101 (1987) (examples
of local government efforts to suppress adult businesses).
49. See supra notes 3, 4.
50. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
This position was first advocated in Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). Powell
argued that the appropriate test for analyzing Detroit's adult entertainment zoning was
the four-part test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), which is
applied when governmental regulation of non-speech interests (e.g., the "secondary
effects" of adult businesses, such as neighborhood deterioration) incidentally affects
interests related to speech (e.g., the dissemination of adult films and books). Young,
427 U.S. at 79; see supra note 26.
In Renton, the majority held that the ordinance should appropriately be analyzed as
a form of time, place, and manner regulation (City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986)); however, rather than utilizing O'Brien's four-part test,
the Court adopted a two-part test that asked whether the ordinance was designed to
serve a substantial governmental interest and allowed for reasonable alternative avenues
of communication. See id. at 41-55. Interestingly, the Court reversed the decision of
the Ninth Circuit, which had analyzed the ordinance under O'Brien (see id. at 46), and
found that the city had failed to demonstrate a substantial governmental interest and had
not proved that the ordinance was unrelated to the suppression of speech. See id. at 41-
55.
51. See cases cited infra notes 59-66; see also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61 (1981); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990).
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that addresses the threshold issue of what constitutes an adult business.
In People v. Superior Court,52 the City of Long Beach had adopted a
dispersion-style ordinance modeled on the Detroit ordinance upheld in
Young. 53 The operators of a two-screen theater that exhibited adult films
on one of the screens were charged in misdemeanor complaints with
unlawfully establishing an adult entertainment business in violation of
the locational restrictions of the ordinance each time they exhibited an
adult film. 54 The court was unanimous in finding this "single use"
standard to be constitutionally infirm, 55 but split 4-3 on the more critical
issue of the appropriate constitutional standard by which to define an
adult use.
The majority, ruling that the "preponderance" standard first an-
nounced by the court of appeal in Pringle v. City of Covina,56 is not
constitutionally compelled, replaced it with a new test: "the regular
and substantial course of conduct" standard.57 In the majority's view,
this new standard allows California municipalities "greater flexibility"
in zoning adult theaters while forbidding the use of the zoning power
as a "pretext for suppressing expression.' ,5 8 While concurring with the
judgment of the court regarding the impropriety of a "single showing"
rule, the dissenting judges strongly criticized the majority for both
52. 774 P.2d 769 (Cal. 1989).
53. Id. at 772.
54. Id. Each of the numerous counts in the indictment referred to the exhibition
of an X-rated movie on a particular day.
55. Id. at 775. The California Supreme Court cited with approval an earlier Ninth
Circuit case, Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernardino County, 827 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1987),
which held that defining a theater as an "adult use" based on a single showing of an
adult movie was "unconstitutional in the absence of evidence 'that a single showing
• . .would have any harmful secondary effects on the community.' "Id. at 771-72
(quoting Tollis v. San Bernardino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1987)).
56. 171 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1981). In this case, the court of appeal held that an adult
entertainment zoning ordinance cannot be enforced against a theater's exhibition of
adult films unless a "preponderance" (meaning "more often than not") of the adult
films shown by the theater "have as their dominant theme the depiction of the ordi-
nance's enumerated sexual activities .. " Id. at 257 (citation omitted).
57. Superior Court, 774 P.2d at 771. The court described the new standard thus:
"[C]ities may zone the location of theaters that show, on a regular basis, films character-
ized by an emphasis on the 'specified sexual activities' or 'specified anatomical areas'
identified in the ordinance where such films constitute a substantial portion of the films
shown or account for a substantial part of the revenues derived from the exhibition of
films ..... Id.
58. Id. at 777 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 84
(1976)). The majority argued that its "regular and substantial course of conduct" test
would provide a construction that is "rationally tailored to support its asserted purpose
of preventing neighborhood blight" without allowing Long Beach the opportunity to
use its zoning power improperly to suppress freedom of expression. Id.
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"judicial legislating" and doing violence to free speech principles.5 9
In recent adult zoning cases applying the criteria established by the
Supreme Court in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. ,6 Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim,61 City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters,
62 61Inc. ,62 and FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, courts have struck down
ordinances because they unduly restricted access to adult businesses,
64
were unconstitutionally vague,65 created an unlawful prior restraint,66
or failed to follow statutory notice requirements prior to adopting the
ordinance; 67 while upholding ordinances that were properly based on
controlling the secondary impacts of adult businesses, 6 did not overly
restrict the sites available for adult businesses, 69 and provided a reason-
59. Justice Mosk (see id. at 779 (Mosk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)), and Justice Kennard, with whom Justice Broussard concurred (see id. at 783
(Kennard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)), each wrote opinions concurring
in the judgment but dissenting as regards the court's replacing the Pringle standard.
60. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
61. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
62. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
63. 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990).
64. In Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 713 F. Supp. 1296 (D. Minn. 1989),
amendments to the city's zoning ordinance enacted in November 1986, shortly after
the Renton decision, were held unconstitutional because the locational restrictions
would result in the closing of several existing adult businesses with no reasonable
opportunity to relocate. The court noted that the amendments would shutter several
long-standing adult businesses-some had been in existence for up to 25 years (id. at
1304)-while restricting both new and relocating adult businesses to 0.54 % of the total
land area of the city. Id. at 1305 n. 11. While this area was much more limited than
the 5.0% made available to adult businesses in the Renton case, that fact alone was not
dispositive; rather, it was the fact that no reasonable opportunities for relocation were
available in that area. Id. at 1305.
This case marked the second time in six years that the city's efforts to regulate the
location of adult businesses had been found unconstitutional. In Alexander v. City of
Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983), the court struck down a similar ordinance
which reduced permissible sites for adult businesses by two-thirds.
65. Alexander, 713 F. Supp. at 1302.
66. Gascoe, Ltd. v. Newtown Township, 699 F. Supp. 1092 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(conditional use denied to video store that intended to rent and sell adult films as
approximately 10 to 25 % of its business on grounds that such films are "offensive");
Landover Books v. Prince George's County, 566 A.2d 792 (Md. App. 1989); 11126
Baltimore Blvd. v. Prince George's County, 684 F. Supp. 884 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1988) (overbroad discretion vested in city officials who administered a special exception
requirement for adult bookstores).
67. Southern Entertainment Co. v. City of Boynton Beach, 736 F. Supp. 1094
(S.D. Fla. 1990).
68. U.S. Partners Fin. Corp. v. Kansas City, 707 F. Supp. 1090 (W.D. Mo. 1989)
(facts indicated that the city's pursuit of its zoning interests through denial of rezoning
for adult entertainment business was unrelated to the suppression of free expression).
69. Centaur, Inc. v. Richland County, 392 S.E.2d 165 (S.C. 1990) (adult business
had at least 16 sites to which it could relocate); Bonnell, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment,
791 P.2d 107 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding ordinance that provided 44 individual
locations in an 1100-acre area which met all the conditions for an adult entertainment
use under the ordinance); International Eateries v. Broward County, 726 F. Supp. 1568
(S.D. Fla. 1989) (adult business could relocate to 26 potential sites in the county without
violating ordinance).
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able amortization period, under the particular circumstances of the case,
for nonconforming adult uses.7°
Finally, we also note the numerous recent decisions that have consid-
ered regulations requiring adult bookstores and theaters that feature
"viewing booths" to remove the booths' entry doors so as to keep the
booths open to public view. 71 These "open door" requirements, which
are not zoning regulations but rather health ordinances designed to
decrease illicit sexual activity and/or the spread of AIDS,72 have been
upheld as valid "time, place and manner" restrictions on expression
73
that do not implicate patrons' privacy rights. 74 However, such ordi-
nances may still be invalid, in part, if they violate other constitutional
safeguards. 7
IV. Regulation of Newsracks
The Supreme Court's 1988 decision in City ofLakewood v. Plain Dealer
Publishing Co. 76 established that municipal regulation of newsracks
raises First Amendment issues, and that a newsrack licensing scheme
70. Centaur, 392 S.E.2d 165 (upholding two-year amortization provision and
noting several cases that upheld amortization periods varying from ninety days to over
five years); PA Northwestern Distrib., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 555 A.2d 1368
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (ninety-day amortization period upheld where adult business
could relocate and improvements to current location could be used by another commer-
cial entity); Bonnell, 791 P.2d 107 (five-year amortization period allowed adult business
a reasonable period of time to come into compliance with ordinance or relocate).
71. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Minneapolis, 898 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1990); Berg v.
Health & Hosp. Corp., 865 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1989); Bamon Corp. v. City of Dayton,
730 F. Supp. 80 (S.D. Ohio 1990); Postscript Enter. v. City of Bridgeton, 699 F. Supp.
1393 (E.D. Mo. 1988); Suburban Video v. City of Delafield, 694 F. Supp. 585 (E.D.
Wis. 1988); Adult Entertainment Ctr. v. Pierce County, 788 P.2d 1102 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1990).
72. Many of the cases cited supra note 71 document the extent to which viewing
booths with closed doors may be used for illicit sexual activities by facilitating sexual
activity either between two persons occupying a single booth or by persons in adjoining
booths by means of a so-called "glory hole" in a wall shared by the booths.
73. See, e.g., Berg, 865 F.2d 797; Adult Entertainment Ctr., 788 P.2d 1102.
74. See Berg, 865 F.2d 797 (rejecting arguments that patrons have a constitutional
right to view adult films behind closed doors in a public establishment); Adult Entertain-
ment Ctr., 788 P.2d 1102 (patrons have no constitutional right to engage in sexual
activity, including masturbation, behind closed doors in a public establishment); Ba-
mon, 730 F. Supp. 80 (patrons have no constitutional right to view sexually explicit,
nonobscene material in private booth of public business; Suburban Video, 694 F. Supp.
585 (same).
75. For example, in Suburban Video, the court invalidated those portions of the
ordinance's adult business licensing scheme that required applicants to supply large
amounts of personal information which had no relationship to the ordinance's stated
purpose of fighting the spread of AIDS, finding that these provisions were an unjustified
prior restraint on expression and violated owners' and employees' right to privacy.
Suburban Video, 694 F. Supp. at 592.
76. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
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cannot grant public officials unfettered discretion in granting or condi-
tioning licenses, but failed to provide answers to other constitutional
questions surrounding municipal regulation of newsracks.77 The cases
discussed below address issues not reached in Lakewood, such as the
validity of locational restrictions, permit fees, and insurance require-
78
ments.
Two recent federal cases involved the same plaintiff, Harlan Jacob-
sen, who publishes two "singles" newspapers, Solo RFD and Singles
Scene, which are distributed through newsracks in several midwestern
states. In Jacobsen v. Harris,79 the Eighth Circuit upheld a Lincoln,
Nebraska, newsrack ordinance that featured many of the elements the
Court had declined to review in its Lakewood decision. 80 The court
found (1) that the ordinance's permit fee was valid because it covered
only the administrative costs associated with processing the permit
8
'
77. In this 4-3 decision, the majority invalidated the Lakewood newsrack licensing
scheme because it vested unbridled discretion in a government official to grant or deny
licenses for conduct protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 770. While this
holding sounds narrow and uncontroversial, the Court split on a critical underlying
question: whether this ordinance regulated newspapers-and thus regulated activity
protected by the First Amendment-directly or indirectly; a question that would deter-
mine whether the Plain Dealer Publishing Company could challenge the ordinance
facially as a potential prior restraint.
In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall,
and Scalia, viewed the ordinance as regulating newspaper circulation, thus directly
involving the First Amendment, and permitted the facial challenge to avoid the possibil-
ity of a prior restraint. Id. at 755 (Brennan, J.) The dissenting members of the Court,
Justices White, Stevens and O'Connor, saw the ordinance as regulating only the place-
ment of newsracks on public property, thus not regulating First Amendment activity
directly, and concluded the ordinance should have been challenged on an "as applied"
basis rather than facially. See id. at 774 (White, J., dissenting).
Because the majority found the ordinance invalid on its face due to the excessive
discretion vested in the mayor, it declined to discuss the validity of other elements of
the ordinance, which included license fees, design review by the city's architectural
review board, and a required indemnification agreement guaranteed by a $100,000
insurance policy. See id. at 772. The dissent not only found that the entire ordinance
passed constitutional muster, but argued that cities could ban newsracks entirely if they
chose because ample alternate means of distribution were available. Id. at 783-84
(White, J., dissenting).
78. There have also been a number of cases involving municipal restrictions on
newspaper vending machines in airports. See, e.g., Gannett Satellite Info. Network v.
Berger, 894 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1990) (standardless rule prohibiting distribution of printed
or written material at Newark Airport without consent of Port Authority violated First
Amendment); Chicago Tribune Co. v. City of Chicago, 705 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (total ban on newsracks in an airport concourse, which does not serve a significant
governmental interest, justifies issuance of preliminary injunction against enforcement
of ban).
79. 869 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1989).
80. Id. at 1173-74.
81. Id. at 1174. On this point, the court cited its own earlier decision in another
case involving this same plaintiff, Jacobsen v. Crivaro, 851 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1988).
See id.
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and (2) that the mandatory insurance requirement was reasonable be-
cause (a) the city had a legitimate interest in protecting itself from
liability for injuries associated with the use of its property, and (b)
there was testimony from a city official that claims arising from objects
placed in the public right-of-way were made quite often.8
2
In Jacobsen v. Petersen,83 however, a federal district court held that
the Pierre, South Dakota, street and sidewalk nonobstruction ordi-
nances 84 violated the First Amendment as they were applied to news-
racks.85 Analyzing the case as one where the city was using a content-
neutral regulation to limit expressive activity in a traditional public
forum, the district court applied a test for "time, place and manner"
restrictions and found the ordinances invalid because they failed to
advance the city's purported interests in traffic and pedestrian safety,
and permitted undue discretion by city officials who administered the
ordinance.
86
In other reported cases involving newsracks, a Pennsauken, New
Jersey, ordinance that excluded newspaper vending machines from
Westfield Avenue, the city's main business street, but allowed them to
be placed "in any other location" on other streets in the city and within
thirty feet of Westfield Avenue on side streets that intersect with it,
was upheld in Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Pennsauken
Township.87 Analyzing the ordinance as a "time, place and manner"
restriction, the court found that the city was unable to prove its asserted
interest in traffic safety but could show that its aesthetic interests, rooted
in a desire to save a once flourishing business district from deterioration,
were valid.88 Finally, in Sebago, Inc. v. City of Alameda,89 the court
had little trouble in striking down an adult entertainment zoning ordi-
nance that restricted the locations of newsracks distributing The Specta-
tor, a successor to the Berkeley Barb, holding that the ordinance was
unconstitutional on its face since it was neither content-neutral nor a
narrowly drawn content-based regulation justified by a compelling state
interest. 90
82. Harris, 869 F.2d at 1174.
83. 728 F. Supp. 1415 (D.S.D. 1990).
84. There were two ordinances at issue. The first prohibited all obstructions on any
street, road, alley or sidewalk, and the second prohibited the placement of any goods
or merchandise so as to obstruct any sidewalk. Id. at 1417.
85. Id. at 1422.
86. Id. at 1420-21.
87. 709 F. Supp. 530 (D.N.J. 1989).
88. Id. at 541.
89. 259 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
90. Id. at 923-25.
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From these cases, we can derive several guidelines for municipal
regulation of newsracks. While cities are free to enact content-neutral
ordinances that regulate the location of newsracks, require reasonable
permit or licensing fees, and contain indemnification or insurance re-
quirements that can be justified by a uniform policy applicable to all
owners of objects placed on public property, such regulation must fur-
ther a valid public purpose. Courts will not simply defer to asserted
municipal interests in traffic and pedestrian safety or aesthetics, but will
require the city to prove the legitimacy of its asserted interests.
However, there is still no clear guidance on the issue of a total ban
on newsracks. With the retirements of Justices Brennan and Marshall,
only two members of the Lakewood majority now sit on the Court; yet
Brennan's liberal opinion was joined by Justice Scalia, so it is not at
all clear how the current Court would treat a ban on newsracks.
The lower federal courts have split on the issue. In Providence Jour-
nal Co. v. City of Newport,91 the court found that barring newsracks
from all public rights-of-way was not unconstitutional per se as a total
prohibition of communicative activity because newspapers could still
be distributed via newsstands and newsboys,92 but held that the city had
failed to justify its asserted significant government interest in aesthetics
and facilitating the flow of pedestrian traffic.93 By contrast, Chicago
Newspaper Publishers Ass 'n v. City of Wheaton, 94 found a total ban on
newsracks in residential neighborhoods an invalid time, place, and
manner regulation both because there were not ample alternatives to
newsracks and the city had not demonstrated that it had adopted the
least restrictive means available to achieve its goals of promoting auto
and pedestrian safety and maintaining the residential character of its
neighborhoods. 9
V. Religious Institutions
A. Zoning
Prior to 1983, no federal appellate court had considered a case involving
the zoning of religious institutions, such litigation was confined to state
91. 665 F. Supp. 107 (D.R.I. 1987).
92. Id. at 112.
93. Id. at 117.
94. 697 F. Supp. 1464 (N.D. 111. 1988).
95. Id. at 1469-70; see also News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Cox, 702 F. Supp. 891
(S.D. Fla. 1988) (statute "attempting to prohibit commercial use of state-maintained
roads was not valid time, place or manner restriction, and was fundamentally incompati-
ble with First Amendment; even though statute was content-neutral, traffic control
FALL 1991
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courts.96 In that year, both the Sixth Circuit, in Lakewood, Ohio Congre-
gation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood,97 and the Eleventh
Circuit, in Grosz v. City of Miami Beach,98 upheld zoning regulations
against First Amendment challenges, using different variations of a
balancing test that weighed the competing interests of municipal regula-
tion and freedom of religion. 99
and safety were significant governmental interests, and ample alternative channels of
communication were available for newspaper publisher challenging violation of its
right to distribute for sale, statute was not narrowly tailored to serve state's asserted
interests"); Southern New Jersey Newspapers v. New Jersey, 542 F. Supp. 173 (D.N.J.
1982) (prohibition of newsracks on major state highways unconstitutional when state
could not justify its interests in aesthetics and traffic safety).
96. State courts normally applied a due process analysis, as opposed to a First
Amendment inquiry, to these cases. In a majority of jurisdictions, zoning regulations
that barred religious institutions from residential areas-the most common form of
restriction-were struck down on the ground that such restrictions do not advance the
public good. See, e.g., Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Incorporated Village of
Roslyn Harbor, 342 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976). But
see Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 503 N.E.2d 509 (N.Y. 1986). A minority of state courts
allow municipalities to exclude religious institutions from residential areas, so long as
they are not totally excluded from the community. See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 203 P.2d
823 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949).
97. 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983).
98. 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983).
99. In Lakewood, the Sixth Circuit used a two-step inquiry, first evaluating the
nature of the religious observance at stake and then the nature of the burden which the
municipality sought to place on the religious observance. See Lakewood, 699 F.2d at
306. The court found the only burden on religious observance posed by the ordinance
was financial: the congregation could worship as it pleased, but was restricted in
locating its proposed sanctuary to an area comprising approximately 10% of the city.
See id. at 307. The court distinguished this minor burden from an ordinance that forced
the congregation to forego religious observance through financial or criminal penalties
or by placing burdensome taxes on the exercise of religious beliefs. See id. Since the
court found no restriction of First Amendment rights, it determined that the municipality
was free to regulate the location of churches in a reasonable manner to maintain the
residential character of certain neighborhoods. See id. at 308.
Grosz employed a slightly different analysis, considering two threshold tests before
balancing the competing interests of the municipality and the First Amendment. See
Grosz, 721 F.2d at 733. First, the court asked whether the government sought to
regulate religious beliefs or opinions rather than merely placing a burden on religious
conduct. While the "government may never regulate religious beliefs, the [First
Amendment] does not prohibit absolutely government regulation [that burdens religious
practices]." Id. Second, the ordinance must have both a secular purpose and effect.
Id. Only if a government regulation passes both of these threshold tests should a court
balance the burden on the city's legitimate interests in maintaining its zoning objectives
against the burden on the plaintiff's right to free exercise of his religion. Id.
In Grosz, an elderly Orthodox Jewish rabbi converted his garage into a sanctuary
for religious worship and as many as 50 congregants would attend religious services
on occasion. Id. at 731. Religious uses were not permitted in this zone, but were allowed
in at least 50% of the residential zones, including an area four blocks from the rabbi's
home. Id. at 732. On these facts, the court found that the ordinance passed both threshold
tests and that the city's substantial interests in maintaining certain wholly residential
HeinOnline  -- 23 Urb. Law. 675 1991
THE URBAN LAWYER VOL. 23, No. 4
Since 1983, the majority of federal courts that have considered reli-
gious challenges to zoning ordinances have upheld those ordinances,
applying either the Grosz or Lakewood analysis. 100 But in Islamic Center
of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Starkville,'0 ' the Fifth Circuit found that
an ordinance, which was applied to deny a special permit for establish-
ment of a mosque at numerous proposed sites, placed more than an
incidental burden on the free exercise of religion because it had the
effect of forcing a group of relatively impecunious university students
to establish their mosque at sites that were reasonably accessible only
by automobile. 02And two federal district court opinions invalidated
ordinances that treated religious worship differently than secular "as-
sembly uses. ' '
Most recently, in Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Jefferson County,'O° a federal district court relied on both Grosz and
Islamic Center to strike down the county's procedure for obtaining a
rezoning to allow development of land for churches, which permitted
decisions to be determined on the basis of the neighborhood's willing-
ness to accept a church.10 5 The court termed this "a thin reed upon
zones free of the noise and crowds associated with religious worship did not unduly
burden freedom of religion since more than half the city was available for religious
institutions. Id. at 738.
100. See Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221 (9th
Cir. 1990) (requirement that church obtain conditional use permit before converting
dwelling in single-family residential district to church use); Messiah Baptist Church v.
County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1988) (barring construction of church
in agricultural zone either as "of right" or by special permit); First Assembly Church
of God v. City of Alexandria, 739 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1984) (requiring church to comply
with fencing, shrubbery, and enrollment restrictions); Cornerstone Bible Church v.
City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654 (D. Minn. 1990) (ordinance permitting churches
in most residential areas and prohibiting churches in commercial and industrial areas);
Congregation Beth Yitzchok v. Town of Ramapo, 593 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(enforcement of local occupancy and fire safety regulations).
101. 840 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1988).
102. Id. at 298-99. The court also found that the city did not treat all religious
institutions that applied for special exceptions alike (id. at 302), and
has advanced no rational basis other than neighborhood opposition to show why the
exception granted all other religious centers was denied the Islamic Center. As the
Supreme Court observed in City of Cleburne Living Center, an equal protection
case, neighbors' negative attitudes or fears, unsubstantiated by factors properly
cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not a permissible basis [for zoning decisions].
Id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)) (footnote
omitted).
103. See Love Church v. City of Evanston, 671 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. fI1. 1987);
Jehovah's Witnesses Assembly Halls v. City of Jersey City, 597 F. Supp. 972 (D.N.J.
1984).
104. 741 F. Supp. 1522 (N.D. Ala. 1990); see also 721 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ala.
1989).
105. 741 F. Supp. at 1530.
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which to base the exercise of religious freedom," and suggested that
the answer was to set aside areas zoned for churches as of right or to
set solely objective standards for rezonings.'06 In other novel cases,
federal courts ruled that the denial of a permit to operate a palmistry
and fortune-telling business was arbitrary and capricious because it
was based on the impermissible "religious" considerations voiced by
neighbors, 10 7 and struck down an ordinance that required a special
permit to operate a day-care center in a single-family residential district,
but allowed "nursery schools" to provide day-care services in church
buildings without a permit, because it violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. 
108
There have also been a number of important recent state court deci-
sions. In City of Colorado Springs v. Blanche,'°9 the Colorado Supreme
Court overruled its 1961 decision in City of Englewood v. Apostolic
Christian Church, "0 which found an ordinance that required a condi-
tional use permit for churches to locate in single- and two-family dis-
tricts to be unconstitutional as a blanket exclusion of churches from
those districts. "' In Colorado Springs, the court stated that it was joining
"the majority of jurisdictions" that make the right of a church to locate
in a particular district permissive rather than absolute. 112
Two Illinois appellate decisions involved regulation of uses associ-
ated with religious institutions. In Bethel Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. Village of Morton,1 3 the court used a First Amendment analysis to
uphold the imposition of an enrollment cap on a parochial school,
arguing that the allowance of an unlimited enrollment would substan-
tially burden the village's interest in safeguarding the residential charac-
ter of the neighborhood. 114 But in Our Saviour's Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. City of Naperville,115 an Illinois appeals court overturned a
lower court's ruling upholding the denial of a conditional use permit
106. Id. at 1534.
107. Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1989).
108. Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 742 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
109. 761 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1988).
110. 362 P.2d 172 (Colo. 1961).
111. Blanche, 761 P.2d at 216.
112. Id. at 216-17; see id. at 217 n.5.
113. 559 N.E.2d 533 (il. App. Ct. 1990).
114. Id. at 536. The court found the enrollment cap constitutional under either the
Grosz balancing test or the "rational due process approach used in previous Illinois
decisions stemming from the standards established in [LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County
of Cook, 145 N.E.2d 65 (111. 1957)]." Id. at 536-38.
115. 542 N.E.2d 1158 (111. App. Ct. 1989).
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for expansion of a church's parking lot. " 6 The lower court, finding that
the church could not state a claim under the First Amendment, con-
cluded that the denial did not limit the church's free exercise of reli-
gion. 117 The appeals court found this to be error." 8 It emphasized that
its own precedents had never "suggested that the parking needs of a
church should be considered on different principles than those applied
to the church building itself,"' 19 and that it was not necessary for a
church to be able to state a claim under the First Amendment for "the
strong presumption of validity accorded to a municipal ordinance [to
be] significantly diminished when the impact of a zoning decision in
some way limits the free exercise of religion. ' ' 2
An interesting New Jersey decision, Burlington Assembly of God
Church v. Zoning Board,'2' involved a challenge to the denial of a
variance that would have permitted a church to construct a radio trans-
mission tower on its property so the church could operate a radio station
as part of its religious mission. 122 The court found that the denial of the
variance was an unconstitutional violation of the church's rights to the
free exercise of religion and freedom of speech that could not be justified
by the township's concerns about safety and possible interference with
television, telephone, and radio usage. 123 In other cases, courts in New
York and Arizona upheld the application of conditional use permit
requirements to operate a religious retreat house in a residential dis-
trict 124 and a building used to print Bibles. 125
116. Id. at 1161.
117. Id. at 1162.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1161 (citing Family Christian Fellowship v. County of Winnebago, 503
N.E.2d 367 (fll. Ct. App. 1986)). Based on this analysis, the appeals court ruled that
the trial court erred in requiring the church to establish its right to the permit by clear
and convincing evidence and found that the church had met its burden of proving that
the proposed use met all the standards required by the zoning ordinance. Id. at 1162-
63.
121. 570 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
122. Id. at 496.
123. Id. at 497.
124. Province of Meribah Society of Mary, Inc. v. Village of Muttontown, 538
N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). Although the court upheld the requirement that
a religious use obtain a special permit, it invalidated a number of conditions that were
imposed upon the grant of that permit because "they purport[ed] to regulate the internal
operations of the user rather than the use of the land and its effect upon surrounding
land." Id. at 853.
125. Cochise County v. Broken Arrow Baptist Church, 778 P.2d 1302 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1989).
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B. Eminent Domain
Two recent cases have upheld government's use of its eminent domain
powers against claims that such action violated the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment. '26 In Matter of Minneapolis Community Devel-
opment Agency, 127 the Supreme Court of Minnesota had little trouble
in finding that the inclusion of a YMCA health and recreation facility
in a development project, which also involved the condemnation of
other properties, did not violate the Establishment Clause. 128 In a more
intriguing case, Southside Fair Housing Committee v. City of New
York,129 the plaintiffs, a fair housing committee and individual Hispan-
ics, Latinos, and African-Americans, challenged the city's right to
sell a square-block parcel in the Williamsburgh section of Brooklyn,
acquired through urban renewal in 1967, to a Talmudical Academy
associated with the Satmar Hasidim. 30 Plaintiffs argued that the sale
violated the Establishment Clause because it had no secular purpose,
advanced the religion of Hasidic Judaism, and caused an excessive
governmental entanglement with religion. 131
On the first claim, the plaintiffs did not argue that there could never
be a secular purpose when the city sold land acquired through eminent
domain to a religious institution; rather, they charged that such a sale
to an Hasidic organization could not have a secular purpose because the
Hasidim have a dogma and practices that are "exclusionary., 132 The
court quickly dismissed this argument, noting that any religious house
126. In addition to these two cases involving Establishment Clause challenges to
government's exercise of its eminent domain powers, see Hewitt v. Joyner, 705 F.
Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1989), which involved an unsuccessful Establishment Clause
challenge to a county's ownership and maintenance of a park containing numerous
sculptures reflecting a religious theme that had been donated to the county by the
sculptor.
127. 439 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. 1989).
128. Id. at 713.
129. 750 F. Supp. 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
130. Id. at 576. The Hasidim are strictly observant Orthodox Jews whose religious
tradition was established in the mid-eighteenth century in the western Ukraine by Israel
ben Eliezer, a mystic who became known as the Baal Shem Toy (Master of the Good
Name). Prior to the Second World War, this movement was centered in the numerous
Jewish communities in Eastern Europe and comprised a significant percentage of the
total Jewish population. In the wake of the Holocaust, the remnants of these Hasidic
communities re-settled in the United States and Israel. The Satmar Hasidim, who are
now concentrated in Brooklyn, take their name from the Romanian city of Satu-Mare.
ISRAEL RUBIN, SATMAR: AN ISLAND IN THE CITY (1972).
131. Southside Fair Housing, 750 F. Supp. at 580. These claims, of course, mirror
the standards set out by the Supreme Court for evaluating Establishment Clause chal-
lenges in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
132. Southside Fair Housing, 750 F. Supp. at 580.
HeinOnline  -- 23 Urb. Law. 679 1991
THE URBAN LAWYER VOL. 23, No. 4
of worship or religious school tends to be largely exclusive in the sense
that people who do not share the beliefs or practices of that particular
religion choose to exclude themselves,'33 found no merit in the other
claims,'3 and ruled in favor of the defendants. 35
Another recent case, Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 3 6 is
the first federal case in which a religious organization has challenged
the condemnation of its property on the basis of the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment. This dispute arose from the efforts of the U.S.
Justice Department to enforce the federal Fair Housing Act against the
city's forty-year practice of concentrating federally subsidized low-
income housing in one section of Yonkers in order to maintain racial
segregation. 137 After an extended legal battle, 38 the city entered into a
consent decree designating seven public housing sites for 200 units of
housing, one of which included a two-acre parcel at the edge of the
forty-four acre campus of St. Joseph's Seminary and College. 139 When
the Roman Catholic Archdiocese rejected the city's offer to purchase the
St. Joseph's property-the reason offered for the rejection by Cardinal
O'Connor was his dissatisfaction with the housing plan because it con-
centrated four of the seven sites in one parish-the federal district court
ordered the city to initiate eminent domain proceedings against the
seminary, which resulted in the seminary's challenging the condemna-
tion on free exercise grounds.'4o
The district court ruled that the alleged interference with the semi-
nary's First Amendment rights had to be balanced against the need to
vindicate the federal constitutional rights of those Yonkers residents
who had been denied fair housing and found the inclusion of the semi-
nary site in the consent decree to be essential. '41 On appeal, the Second
Circuit ruled that the condemnation could only be justified if it were
essential to achieve a compelling state interest and no alternative means
133. Id. at 582.
134. Id. at 585.
135. Id.
136. 858 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1988).
137. See Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990).
138. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988); United
States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Housing Remedy
Order), aff'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
139. Housing Remedy Order, 837 F.2d at 1194.
140. Id. at 1237.
141. Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855, 861 (2d Cir. 1988).
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of accomplishing the state's compelling interest are available. 142 Finding
that the city had steadfastly refused to designate a substitute site for
the Seminary property on the ground that there were no "politically
acceptable" alternatives, 143 the court stated that "political expediency
is far from a compelling reason to force the Seminary to give up its
property in derogation of a constitutional right"" and remanded the
matter to the district court for a plenary hearing to examine the availabil-
ity of reasonable alternative sites. 141 Ultimately, a substitute site was
agreed to.46
C. Historic Preservation
Three major cases in the past year have considered either federal or
state constitutional challenges to the application of historic preservation
ordinances to churches. In First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle 47
and Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Commission, 148 the highest
courts in Washington and Massachusetts, respectively, struck down
historic preservation ordinances that attempted to regulate church prop-
erties; while in St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 149 the
challenged historic preservation ordinance was upheld by the Second
Circuit. This report will first discuss the Society of Jesus case, which
differs from the other two in that it involved restrictions on a church's
interior, rather than exterior, and was decided on state, rather than
federal, constitutional grounds.
The Church of the Immaculate Conception, located in Boston's South
End, while one of the "finer examples of classic mid-nineteenth century
church design," was also an "aging, oversized building [with] sparse
attendance" that the Jesuits planned to renovate into office, counseling,
and residential space. 50 When the renovation work began, however,
the Boston Landmarks Commission designated portions of the church's
142. Id. at 871.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 872.
145. Id.
146. Conversation with Robert Meade, Esq., White Plains, N.Y., attorney for the
seminary (1991).
147. 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct.
1097 (1991).
148. 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
149. 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
150. Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 572.
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interior as a landmark.' 5' The Jesuits then sought court review of the
designation claiming it was invalid on constitutional grounds.
52
The Jesuits argued that the designation of the interior of the church
as a landmark violated provisions in both the federal and state constitu-
tions. '53 Because the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
the designation violated Article II of the state constitution,' 54 which
guarantees freedom of religious belief and practice "subject only to
the conditions that the public peace not be disturbed and the religious
worship of others not be obstructed," it did not reach the remaining
constitutional claims. 55
The landmark designation violated Article II, the court ruled, because
it "restrain[ed] the Jesuits from worshipping 'in the manner and season
most agreeable to the dictates of [their] own conscience.' "0 56 The court
argued that "[t]he configuration of the church interior is so freighted
with religious meaning that it must be considered part and parcel of the
Jesuits' religious worship.' ,5 Further, the religious conduct burdened
by the designation was not within the narrow exemption in Article II
permitting regulation of conduct that disturbs the peace.' 58 Finally,
the court ruled that the government interest in historic preservation,
although worthwhile, was not sufficiently compelling to justify a re-
straint on the free exercise of religion, concluding that: "[U]nder our
hierarchy of constitutional values we must accept the possible loss of
historically significant elements of the interior of this church as the price
of safeguarding the right of religious freedom." "9
It is important to note that the Society of Jesus court found that
151. Id. The designation specifically restricted permanent alteration of the "nave,
chancel, vestibule and organ loft on the main floor-the volume, window glazing,
architectural detail, finsihes, painting, the organ, and organ case" without the commis-
sion's approval. Id.
152. Id. A short time after filing this appeal, the Jesuits sought commission approval
for a revised renovation plan-involving significant changes to the main altar, taberna-
cles, and altar tables-which was denied. Id. They then filed another application for
design approval, "calling for screening the main altar rather than removing it," which
was ultimately approved. Id. These renovations were completed. Id.
153. Id.
154. Article H provides, in part: "[No subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained
in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession or
sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their
religious worship." MASS. CONST. art. II.
155. Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 573.
156. Id. (quoting MAss. CONST. art. II).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 574.
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landmark designation of the interior itself, not the manner in which the
landmark regulations were applied to the various proposed renovations,
violated the religious freedom of the Jesuits. While Society of Jesus
involved designation of the church's interior and was decided on state
constitutional grounds, in First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle,' 6
the Supreme Court of Washington came to a similar conclusion in a
case involving landmark designation of a church's exterior that was
decided under both the federal and state constitutions.
After its designation as a landmark in 1985, the First Covenant
Church sued the City of Seattle, seeking a declaratory judgment that
landmark designation of churches was unconstitutional and that the
enactment of an ordinance specifically designating First Covenant
Church as a landmark was void. 16' The trial court held that the landmarks
ordinance was properly applied to churches and that until the city took
some action under the landmarks ordinance that burdened the church-
i.e., something beyond mere designation as a landmark-the church's
claim that the landmarks ordinance violated its rights of religious free-
dom was premature. 1
62
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court on both
issues. The court first found that the church's claim was ripe for adjudi-
cation, largely because the church, having "unsuccessfully appealed
the designation decision through numerous administrative procedures
set forth in the Landmarks Preservation Ordinance ... has exhausted
its administrative remedies" and there were no further means to chal-
lenge the designation other than in the courts. 1
63
160. 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct.
1097 (1991).
161. See id.
162. Id. at 1354.
163. Id. at 1356. The Washington court judged the church's claim under the ripeness
doctrine developed by the Supreme Court in a 1967 trilogy of cases. See Abbott Lab.
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'nv. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967);
Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967). Those cases call for a two-part
analysis to determine whether a pre-enforcement challenge to an administrative regula-
tion is ripe for judicial review: "first to determine whether the issues tendered are
appropriate for judicial resolution, and second to assess the hardship to the parties if
judicial relief is denied .... " Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. at 162. The "appropriate-
ness" prong of the test looks to whether the issues raised are primarily legal, and thus
do not require further factual development, and whether the challenged action is final.
Standard Alaska Prod. Co. v. Schaible, 874 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1989). The
"hardship" prong requires an evaluation of "the hardship to the parties of withholding
[or granting] court consideration." Abbott Lab., 387 U.S. at 149.
The court had little trouble holding that the church's challenge was ripe, resolving
the issue in four brief paragraphs. It ruled that the factual record regarding the designa-
tion was complete, that the designation ordinance constituted a final action by the
landmarks commission, and that the church had exhausted its administrative remedies
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Turning to the substantive claim, the court, relying on the Supreme
Court's free exercise decisions prior to Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources v. Smith,'64 applied a strict scrutiny analysis
to the landmark ordinance. It first found that the practical effect of the
landmark ordinance was to require a religious organization to seek
secular approval of matters potentially affecting the Church's practice
of religion and termed the ordinance's "liturgy exception"' 65 a "vague
and unworkable criterion that fails to accommodate the constitutional
rights of the Church and infringes on the Church membership's ability
to freely practice its religion. " 66Further, even if the liturgy exception
were an appropriate criterion, its requirement that the church submit
its plans to a secular body and negotiate possible alternatives "creates
unjustified governmental interference in religious matters of the Church
by pursuing its appeal of the designation through procedures provided in the ordinance.
First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1356.
This ruling should be contrasted with that of the New York Court of Appeals in
Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d 183 (N.Y. 1986). There,
the church sought a declaratory judgment that its designation as a landmark was uncon-
stitutional as a violation of both the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment (id. at 185); the latter claim being identical
to that made in First Covenant. The court engaged in an extensive consideration of the
ripeness issue in the context of the court's standard for a takings claim by a nonprofit
institution designated as a landmark-" whether the Landmarks Law, as applied, pre-
vents or seriously interferes with plaintiffs ability to carry out its charitable purpose."
Id. at 190 (citing Matter of Society of Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 415 N.E.2d 922
(N.Y. 1980)). The Court concluded that the takings claim was not ripe because its
determination would require a "careful examination of facts not yet developed per-
taining to" the effect of future landmark commission rulings on the church's rebuilding
program. Id. at 200.
The court then considered whether its decision on the ripeness issue should be
different because the church also based its claim in part on prospective interference
with its right to free exercise of religion. Id. at 191. Here the court found that the nature
of the claimed prospective interference-restrictions on its rebuilding program and "its
inability to afford the repair requirements of the [landmarks ordinance] "-was "neither
dependent upon nor peculiar to its religious character." Id. at 192. In its view, this was
wholly insufficient to make the church's claim ripe. See id.
164. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
165. The ordinance stated, in pertinent part:
[N]othing herein shall prevent any alteration of the exterior when such alterations
are necessitated by changes in liturgy, it being understood that the owner is the
exclusive authority on liturgy and is the decisive party in determining what architec-
tural changes are appropriate to the liturgy. When alterations necessitated by changes
in liturgy are proposed . . . the Board shall issue a Certificate of Approval. Prior
to the issuance of any Certificate, however, the Board and owner shall jointly explore
such possible alternative design solutions as may be appropriate or necessary to
preserve the designated features of the landmark.
Id. at 1360 (quoting SEATTLE, WASH., CITY ORDINANCE § 112425.2 (1985)).
166. First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1360.
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and thereby creates an infringement on the Church's constitutional right
of free exercise. ,1
67
Having found a substantial infringement of the church's right to free
exercise of religion, the court next considered whether that interference
was justified by a compelling state interest. After noting that landmark
preservation laws deal with aesthetic and cultural values, not issues
involving the health and safety of citizens, 168 the court discussed the
Supreme Court's ruling in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City'69 that landmark preservation represented an important state
interest and concluded it was "most likely" that the Court would not
have found landmark preservation to be a compelling state interest had
it been required to analyze the law under strict scrutiny. 1
70
Holding that landmark preservation is not a compelling state inter-
est, 171 the Washington court found that the aesthetic and community
values associated with landmark preservation were clearly outweighed
by the constitutional protection of the free exercise of religion and the
public benefits associated with the practice of religious worship within
the community. 1
72
On March 4, 1991, however, the U.S. Supreme Court, after
granting certiorari in this case, 17 vacated the judgment and re-
manded 74 to the Washington Supreme Court for further consideration
in light of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith. 175 Given that the Supreme Court in Smith abandoned the
compelling state interest test as the standard for judging free exercise
challenges to laws of general application that burden religious prac-
tice, 176 the portion of the Washington court's opinion holding that the
Seattle ordinance violates the federal constitution 177 is no longer valid.
While the Washington court stated that it also found the ordinance
violative of the state constitution, 178 it did not cite a single Washington
167. Id. at 1361.
168. Id.
169. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
170. First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1361.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Seattle v. First Covenant Church, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991).
174. Id.
175. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
176. See id. at 1597.
177. See First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1361.
178. Id. at 1353. Article 1 of the Washington Constitution provides that "[a]bsolute
freedom of conscience in all matters of religious... worship. . . shall be guaranteed
to every individual." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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case as authority for using the compelling state interest test, relying
entirely on the Supreme Court's cases prior to Smith.'79
On remand, it seems highly unlikely that a majority of the court
will hold that the Washington Constitution requires a compelling state
interest test in this case. This was a 5-4 decision that featured an unusual
concurring opinion authored by Justice Utter, and joined by two other
members of the majority, urging the court to adopt the New York
"charitable purpose" test 18 as the means for evaluating free exercise
claims in future land-use cases. 18' The four dissenting Justices found
that the liturgy exception, as interpreted by the city in its own court
papers, serves to remove any potential threat to the church's free exer-
cise rights. 18 2 On this basis they would hold the ordinance does not apply
to any changes made to the church for "religious purposes," thus
eliminating any First Amendment issue in the case.
On the same day that the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in
First Covenant and remanded the case to the Washington Court, it
denied certiorari in Rector of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew's Church
v. City of New York (St. Bart s), 183 where the Second Circuit, citing
Smith, upheld the New York Landmarks Law against free exercise and
takings claims.84
St. Bart's involved a lengthy battle between the New York City
Landmarks Commission and a landmarked church located on Park Ave-
nue between 50th and 51st Streets.'85 The church sought commission
approval to demolish its seven-story "community house" adjacent to
the main church building and erect a fifty-nine story office tower in its
place. 186 When this first request was denied as an inappropriate alter-
ation, the church filed a second application, scaling down its proposed
tower to forty-seven stories. 87 When this application was also denied,
the church filed a third application under a different procedure, com-
monly known as the "hardship exception," claiming that the commis-
sion should issue a certificate of appropriateness for the forty-seven
story tower because the community house was inadequate and the
179. See First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1357.
180. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
181. First Covenant, 787 P.2d at 1364-65.
182. Id. at 1366.
183. 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
184. Id. at 348.
185. Id. at 351.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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church needed the revenues it would obtain from the new building both
to maintain its sanctuary and expand its social welfare programs. 
188
After several lengthy public hearings and open executive sessions,
the commission denied the application because the church had failed to
prove the necessary hardship. 189 The church then filed suit against the
commission and the city in federal district court, claiming that the
landmarks law, facially and as applied to the church, violates both the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment by
excessively burdening the practice of religion and entangling the gov-
ernment in religious affairs.'90 It also alleged that the law violates the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because it applies different standards to charitable and commercial
institutions and constitutes a taking of property without just compensa-
tion. 191
In analyzing the church's takings claim, an issue of first impression
in the federal courts, the district court applied the "charitable purpose"
standard articulated by the New York state courts: an unconstitutional
taking exists "where the landmark designation [of property owned by
a charitable organization] would prevent or seriously interfere with the
carrying out of the charitable purpose of the institution."' 92 The district
188. Id. at 351-352.
189. The hardship exception is found in N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 25-309(a)(2)(c)
(1985), which states that a certificate of appropriateness shall be granted to a not-for-
profit applicant who shows, inter alia, that such "improvement has ceased to be ade-
quate, suitable or appropriate for use for carrying out both (1) the purposes of such
owner to which it is devoted and (2) those purposes to which it had been devoted when
acquired unless such owner is not [sic] longer engaged in pursuing such purposes."
Id. at 352 n. 1.
190. Id. at 352.
191. Id. The church also "alleged a variety of procedural due process violations and
brought a pendent state law claim alleging that the Church should have been granted
a certificate of appropriateness under New York law." Id.
192. Id. The majority of the few cases claiming that the application of a landmark
ordinance to a religious institution constitutes a taking arose in New York and were
decided under the standard adopted by the district court in St. Bart's. Prior to that
decision, no federal court had addressed this issue; however, in Maher v. New Orleans,
371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 905 (1976), the Fifth Circuit, in a case involving a commercial use, established
a standard for determining when application of an historic district ordinance would be
confiscatory: an ordinance is unconstitutional when it" 'goes so far as to preclude the
use of property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted.'" Id. at 662 (quoting
Summers v. City of Glen Cove, 217 N.E.2d 663 (1966)). This standard is satisfied
when the claimant proves that sale, rental or renovation of the property is financially
impractical. Maher, 516 F.2d at 1066.
The Maher standard, rather than the New York courts' charitable purpose test, has
been applied to religious institutions by at least two state courts. In First Presbyterian
Church v. City Council of York, 360 A.2d 257 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976), the church
had been denied permission to demolish the York House, a building adjacent to the
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court applied the same test to the claim of an unconstitutional burden
on religion, observing that "to prevail on either claim plaintiff must
prove that it can no longer carry out its religious mission in its existing
facilities."' 93 Finding that the church could not meet this burden of
proof, the district court upheld the commission and city on both
claims. 194
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed both of the lower court's
rulings,1 95 but did not endorse the application of the charitable purpose
test to either the takings or free exercise claims.'96 Citing a number of
Supreme Court free exercise cases, including Smith, which was decided
after the district court decision, the court of appeals found that "the
Landmarks Law is a valid, neutral law of general applicability" and
agreed with the district court that the church failed to prove that it cannot
continue its religious practices in its existing facilities. 197 The Second
Circuit based its analysis of the takings claim on the Supreme Court's
decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York:' 98
"Applying the Penn Central standard to property used for charitable
purposes, the constitutional question is whether the land-use regulation
impairs the continued operation of the property in its originally expected
use. "99 The court answered this question in the negative, concluding
"that the Landmarks Law does not effect an unconstitutional taking
because the Church can continue its existing charitable and religious
activities in its current facilities."200
We are left with the question of what these three important cases,
sanctuary, to enlarge its parking facilities. Both the church and the York House were
in an historic district. Id. at 259. The church sued, claiming that denial of the permit
amounted to a taking, and urged the court to apply the charitable purpose test. Id. The
court chose to rely on Maher, however, arguing that Maher was the proper test for
takings claims in an historic district since the charitable purpose test arose in cases
involving individually designated landmarks, and found that the church had failed to
carry its burden of proof. Id. at 261.
Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Scott, 553 S.W.2d 856 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977), also
involved a church seeking permission to demolish a building within an historic district
to expand its parking facilities. As in the York case, the court applied the Maher test
and concluded that the church failed to meet its burden of proof. See id. at 863.
193. 914 F.2d at 353.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 355-56.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 354-56. In a footnote, the Second Circuit also agreed that the district
court had been correct to dismiss the church's claim that the landmarks law violated
the Establishment Clause. Id. at 356 n.4.
198. 438 U.S. 104, 144 (1978)
199. St. Ban's, 914 F.2d at 356.
200. Id.
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considered in relation to one another, mean. To start, the Supreme
Court, by denying certiorari in St. Bart's,2 ° which relied on Smith, on
the same day it vacated the judgment in First Covenant, and remanding
the case to the Washington Supreme Court in light of Smith,2°2 has sent
two clear signals: first, landmark laws are not suspect under the federal
Constitution merely because they apply to churches; and second, a
church will not be excused from complying with landmark laws, on
federal constitutional grounds, unless it can prove that meeting those
requirements leaves it unable to carry out its religious mission.
That still leaves open the question of whether state courts may find
greater protection for religious institutions under provisions of their
state constitutions. Although the Massachusetts court invalidated the
landmark law in Society of Jesus on the basis of the state constitution,203
it is unlikely that case will have broad application for two reasons. First,
the case involved landmark designation of the church's interior. Few
ordinances authorize such designation, likely because landmark com-
missions recognize that such designations can easily raise significant
First Amendment issues.2° Second, the "free exercise clause" of the
Massachusetts Constitution is stated in far broader terms205 than the
corresponding clause in the federal Constitution2 6 and has a legislative
history that emphasizes its role in guaranteeing freedom of choice as to
manner of worship.207 Thus, while it is true that many state constitutions
201. 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
202. 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991).
203. Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Mass.
1990).
204. In many faiths, the design and arrangement of architectural features and station-
ary ritual objects within the interior of a sanctuary is rigorously defined by religious
rules and/or customs. For example, Orthodox Judaism requires that seating for men
be physically separated from seating for women by screening off a women's section
or limiting women's seating to a balcony, and customarily places a large "reader's
platform" in the center of the sanctuary. Reform and Conservative Judaism do not
segregate women and have discarded the central platform. Consider, then, the free
exercise challenges that would ensue if either: (1) an Orthodox synagogue, whose
interior had been designated as a landmark, were sold to a Reform congregation, which
was then denied permission to remove the central platform and the screening from
the women's seating area; or, (2) an Orthodox congregation purchases a Reform
synagogue with a landmarked interior and is then denied permission to install a central
platform and screened off women's section.
205. "[N]o subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person, liberty, or
estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates
of his own conscience; or for his religious profession or sentiments; provided he doth
not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious worship." MAss.
CONST. art. II.
206. "Congress shall make no law. . . prohibiting the free exercise" of religion.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
207. See Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 572-73.
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guarantee freedom of religion in terms far broader than those in the First
Amendment, few, if any, feature the combination of broadly protective
terminology and legislative history found in Massachusetts.208
First Covenant, remanded to the Washington Supreme Court for
reconsideration in light of Smith,2 9 is an unlikely candidate to create
greater protection for churches under the state constitution. While the
Court may well sustain its original judgment because of the particular
factual record in this case, a majority of the Justices are already on
record as disavowing the notion that mere landmark designation of
a church's exterior states a constitutional violation under the federal
Constitution as it was interpreted prior to Smith. Thus, there is little
chance that the previous plurality will attract the fifth vote necessary
for a majority opinion holding that the state constitution is violated when
a church is landmarked.
We can conclude, therefore, that landmark ordinances are now gener-
ally safe from First Amendment challenges, so long as they do not seek
to regulate the interiors of houses of worship against the wishes of
religious institutions and do not totally frustrate the accomplishment of
the religious mission of the institution.
VI. Local Regulation of Signs and Billboards
A. In General
Though the messages on signs or billboards, whether commercial or
noncommercial in content, are forms of speech protected by the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court generally has sanctioned local regula-
tions of these land uses. Standards for assessing the constitutionality
of sign restrictions are set out in the Supreme Court's opinions in
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego2'0 and Members of the City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent.211 Content-neutral and reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions are permissible. 12 For regulation to
be valid, it must directly further a sufficiently substantial governmental
objective unrelated to the suppression of speech and be no more restric-
208. For example, the parallel provision of the Washington Constitution, which
will be construed in First Covenant on remand, provides that "[a]bsolute freedom of
conscience in all matters of religious ... worship ... shall be guaranteed to every
individual." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
209. First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990) (en
banc), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991).
210. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
211. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
212. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. 490; Taxpayers v. Vincent, 466 U.S. 789.
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tive than necessary to achieve the governmental objective.213 In applying
this balancing test, a court also may consider whether the impact of the
regulation leaves open ample alternative channels of communication
for expression.214 Generally, courts in recent years, in applying these
standards for validity, have upheld a variety of types of local regulation
of signs and billboards, including total bans on off-site commercial
signs, based on the governmental objectives of traffic safety and aes-
thetics.215
B. Purpose of Zoning Regulations
Traffic safety, highway beautification, aesthetics,216 and elimination of
nonconforming signs2 7 are substantial governmental interests, but some
cases suggest that aesthetic considerations alone are not enough to pre-
vail as a substantial governmental interest.21 s Local zoning regulations
must have a specific stated purpose in the portion of the zoning code
in question that states a substantial governmental interest, or that pur-
pose must be demonstrated by extrinsic evidence. 219 The purpose cannot
be assumed; a general statement in the preamble is not enough to provide
a rationale. 220 Also, the Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled that a
single purpose does not have to apply to all the area in a municipality
to be valid. 22' It said that as long as the means fulfills the purpose, the
213. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 805.
214. See Burns v. Barrett, 561 A.2d 1378 (Conn.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 563
(1989) (signs and billboards can be used for communication if farther than 500 feet
from the highway).
215. See Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Local Control of Signs and Billboards: An Analy-
sis of Recent Regulatory Efforts, 8 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 161 (1985).
216. See Burns, 561 A.2d at 1383.
217. See Ackerley Communications of Mass., Inc. v. City of Somerville, 878 F.2d
513, 518 (1st Cir. 1989) (purpose of statute was to reduce the number of nonconforming
noncommercial and on-site commercial signs); Circle K Corp. v. City of Mesa, 803
P.2d 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (permit for new on-site sign conditioned on removal of
non-conforming sign constitutional); see also Fort Collins v. Root Outdoor Advertising,
788 P.2d 149 (Colo. 1990).
218. See Ackerley Communications, 878 F.2d at 520-21 (aesthetics as an interest
underlying a zoning ordinance is proper, but "it [is] highly unlikely that aesthetics ever
could be a sufficient justification for a penalty on speech .... "); Art Van Furniture,
Inc. v. City of Kentwood, 437 N.W.2d 380, 383-84 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (plaintiff's
burden of proof includes showing that no reasonable governmental interest is being
advanced by the zoning ordinance; aesthetics alone, while "a valid part of the general
welfare concept. . . may not serve as the sole reason for excluding a legitimate use
of property." (citations omitted)) .
219. National Advertising Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir.
1990).
220. See id.
221. Burns v. Barrett, 561 A.2d 1378, 1383 (Conn.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 563
(1989).
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legislature has the discretion to determine where to apply the zoning
ordinance and when to grant exceptions.222
The statute's purpose, however, is not always controlling. The U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois said that while there
may be an explicit purpose stated in the zoning code, the ordinance must
be interpreted according to its plain language, even if to interpret it
otherwise would be more consistent with the stated purpose. 223 Spot
zoning cannot be used to contravene the federal and state governments'
intentions.224 In L& W Outdoor Advertising Co. v. State of Indiana,225
when state and federal law did not allow agricultural land to house
billboards, the municipality changed the zoning of land with billboards
on it from agricultural to commercial.226 The court ruled that "local
zoning authorities must conform to reality and observe the intent of
both the federal and state laws concerning . . . beautification." 2 27 It is
unconstitutional for the purpose of spot zoning to be in contradiction
to the state and federal intent; it, therefore, cannot circumvent state and
federal law through spot zoning.228
C. Political and Commercial Speech Distinctions
Courts continue to strike down as unconstitutional ordinances that draw
distinctions between commercial and political speech-prohibiting po-
litical speech, while permitting commercial speech. 229 Following Met-
romedia,230 the court in Able v. Town of Orangetown3 found a facially
content-neutral ordinance constitutional even though a permit was re-
quired to post signs.232 The plaintiff argued that review of the signs
before a permit was granted gave the town officials absolute discre-
tion. 233 The court ruled that "[i]n the absence of unconstitutional appli-
222. Id. (regulation applied to highway intersections in municipalities with a popula-
tion of less than 40,000 residents).
223. Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 734 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
224. Id.
225. 539 N.E.2d 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
226. Id. at 498.
227. Id. at 499.
228. Id.
229. Runyon v. Fasi, No. 90-00752, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5311 (D. Haw. Apr.
15, 1991) (ordinance that prohibited all outdoor political signs on both public and
private property overbroad and unconstitutional); see also National Advertising Co. v.
Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1990) (cannot discriminate between commer-
cial and noncommercial speech, favoring commercial speech).
230. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
231. 724 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
232. Id. at 234-35.
233. Id. at 234.
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cation, an ordinance restricting the posting of signs on the public ways
to preserve the aesthetic appeal of the town is within the bounds of the
constitution.' ,234 Content distinctions are valid if based on on-site and
off-site locations as long as noncommercial copy is permitted on any
sign that is otherwise allowed and the distinctions are point-of-view
neutral. 235 On-site versus off-site236 distinctions regarding commercial
messages are not considered content-based distinctions and are, there-
fore, permissible. 237 Seemingly content-neutral ordinances can become
content-based when they are conditioned on speech made prior to the
effective date of the ordinance, not to prospective speech. 238 "It is
without question that the government may not impose a penalty-in this
case, denying the right to continue speaking by means of nonconforming
signs-because of a person's constitutionally protected past speech
...The impropriety of distinguishing between speakers in this manner
is evidenced by the significant chilling effect that we envision ..
D. Size, Type, and Manner Restrictions
1. SIZE
Size restrictions continue to be valid time, place, and manner restric-
tions.240 However, these size restrictions must be based on reasonable,
rational government objectives. In Art Van Furniture Inc. v. City of
Kentwood24 1 (decided on due process grounds), the city limited a single
advertiser to a 100 square foot on-site sign where multiple tenants in
the same building would have qualified for signs of 791 square feet.242
234. Id. at 235.
235. National Advertising Co. v. Village of Downers Grove, 561 N.E.2d 1300 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990).
236. An onsite sign carries a message that bears some
relationship to the activities conducted on the premises where the sign is located
.... Depending upon the business or agency, the message on the sign may be
deemed either commercial or noncommercial. An offsite sign ... carries a message
unrelated to its particular location. These signs also may display either commercial
or noncommercial messages.
Ackerley Communications v. City of Somerville, 878 F.2d 513, 513 n.l (1st Cir.
1989).
237. National Advertising Co., 561 N.E.2d at 1307.
238. Ackerley Communications, 878 F.2d 513.
239. Id. at 519.
240. National Advertising Co., 561 N.E.2d at 1308 ("[I]t is [ permissible for a
municipality to restrict to a greater degree the size of off-site signs it allows. Any
disparity between the size of noncommercial off-site and on-site signs is a result of a
proper time, place, and manner restriction.").
241. 437 N.W.2d 380 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
242. Id. at 384.
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The court ruled that the substantial governmental interests in traffic
safety and aesthetics were rationally related to the purpose of the ordi-
nance. 243 However, it is invalid for a municipality to strictly enforce an
ordinance that would be "to the detriment of a sole tenant as opposed
to multiple tenants 244 because "[t]he governing rule is one of reason
* . . [and] the ordinance is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable as
applied ....
2. TYPE
Under the standards in Metromedia, recent court decisions have upheld
the constitutionality of regulations banning all off-site commercial
signs, banning all off-site billboards in certain areas and prohibiting the
construction of any new off-premises outdoor advertising structure.
246
However, in a recent case, Bell v. Township of Stafford ,247 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held unconstitutional a local ordinance totally
prohibiting all off-premises advertising signs, including noncommercial
signs, within the municipality.248 Following earlier decisions, the court
held that a total municipal-wide ban on all off-premises signs drastically
encroached on freedom of speech and expression and that a city's burden
in justifying such a ban was particularly strenuous .249 The New Jersey
court found that the city had not shown that the total ban was the least
restrictive means available to promote traffic safety and aesthetics
250
and, in any case, there was no adequate showing by the city that alterna-
tive means of communication of noncommercial messages were left
251open by the ordinance.
Since the Metromedia decision, regulation banning portable signs but
allowing permanent or freestanding signs in the same area has in some
cases been upheld by the courts.252 However, other courts have found
243. Id.
244. Id. at 385.
245. Id. at 384.
246. See Burns v. Barrett, 561 A.2d 1378 (Conn. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
563 (1989); Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 174
(1988), aff'd in unpublished decision, Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of
Raleigh, No. 89-1571, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 5714 (4th Cir. Feb. 8, 1991); Georgia
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1987).
247. 541 A.2d 692 (N.J. 1988).
248. Id. at 693.
249. Id. at 698-99.
250. Id. at 699.
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., Rent-A-Sign v. City of Rockford, 406 N.E.2d 943 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980).
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no reasonable basis for such a distinction based on aesthetics or traffic
safety, where freestanding permanent signs are allowed.253 Two recent
federal court decisions have upheld total bans on portable signs dis-
playing commercial or noncommercial messages..2 ' Both courts held
that great deference should be shown to a local governmental body's
decision that such a ban would further the city's interest in curing
aesthetic blight. 55
3. MANNER
Courts have used the public policy of construing statutes strictly to
eliminate nonconforming uses to extend the reach of time, place, and
manner restrictions. In Circle K Corp. v. City of Mesa ,256 the corpora-
tion requested a permit for a new on-site sign, without changing the
existing nonconforming on-site sign.257 The municipality refused to
issue a permit for the new sign on the removal of the nonconforming
sign saying that the new sign was an addition to the property the noncon-
forming sign was on. 58 The corporation argued that the freestanding,
nonconforming on-site sign was not part of the property for which
the permit was requested. 259 The court ruled that a municipality may
consider on-site signs as inherently connected to the business it adver-
tises; 260 therefore, "any change to any part of the Circle K property
could be considered a change to the existing property." 2 61 Conditions
on permits are constitutional as long as they promote a substantial
262governmental purpose.
E. Amortization and Grandfather Clauses
Recent court decisions continue to reject facial "taking" challenges
to sign and billboard amortization provisions .263 However, courts in
253. See, e.g., Dills v. Cobb County, 593 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
254. Lindsay v. City of San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1010 (1988); Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051
(11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
255. Lindsay, 821 F.2d at 1109; Don's Porta Signs, 829 F.2d at 1053.
256. 803 P.2d 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
257. Id. at 459.
258. Id. at 460.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 462.
261. Id. at 461.
262. Id. at 464.
263. Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1102 (1987), aff'd in unpublished decision, No. 89-
1571, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 5714 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 1991) (sign ordinance with
five-and-one-half-year amortization period is not a taking because the amortization
period allowed a partial recoupment of the owner's investment); Georgia Outdoor
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Pennsylvania and Georgia, relying on state constitutional taking provi-
sions, recently held local ordinance amortization provisions to consti-
tute invalid "takings" of property. 264 The Pennsylvania Superior Court
held that a brief ninety-day amortization period for an adult bookstore
was unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution because the
owner of the bookstore had a vested right that could not be removed. 65
Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court found that the Georgia Constitu-
tion, which states that private property may not be "taken or damaged
for public purposes" 266 was violated when the owners of nonconforming
267signs were not compensated for the removal of their signs.
In contrast, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Ackerley Communi-
cations of Massachusetts, Inc. v. City of Somerville,26 invalidated a
zoning ordinance based on the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion without reaching the takings issue.2 69 The City of Somerville cre-
ated an ordinance that grandfathered all on-site nonconforming signs
carrying both commercial and noncommercial messages, and all non-
conforming off-site commercial signs that carried noncommercial mes-
sages. 270 Ackerley Communications requested a variance for its com-
mercial off-site signs, and when it appeared the variance would be
denied, announced it would change all its nonconforming commercial
signs to nonconforming noncommercial signs and, thus, qualify for the
grandfather provision in the ordinance.271 In reaction to this announce-
ment, the City of Somerville changed the ordinance to require that all
nonconforming off-site signs, in order to qualify for the grandfather
provision, had to have contained exclusively noncommercial messages
for the previous year.272 This provision allowed approximately seven
of Ackerley's approximately 200 signs to qualify for the grandfather
provision.273
Advertising v. City of Waynesville, 900 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1990) (presence of amortiza-
tion clause does not establish the validity of an ordinance as a matter of law, but the
absence of an amortization provision does not constitute an automatic taking); see also
Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1988).
264. PA Northwestern Distrib., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 584 A.2d 1372 (Pa.
1991); Lamar Advertising v. City of Albany, 389 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. 1990).
265. PA Northwestern, 584 A.2d 1372 (Pa. 1991).
266. GA. CONST. art. 1, § 3, I(a).
267. Lamar Advertising, 389 S.E.2d at 217-18.
268. 878 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1989).
269. Id. at 522.
270. For a definition of on-site and off-site, see supra note 236.
271. Ackerly Communications, 878 F.2d at 514-15.
272. Id. at 515.
273. Id.
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The court ruled that, even though in some instances it may be permis-
sible to regulate content,274 in this instance the regulation violated the
First Amendment.275 While the ordinance passed Metromedia because it
allowed noncommercial speech anywhere and in addition to commercial
speech, it failed because it penalized speakers for their past lawful
speech.276 "[T]he issue is whether a severe penalty-a prohibition
against future speech-may be imposed on a speaker because he in the
past engaged in a certain kind of lawful but less favored speech. We
conclude that the First Amendment does not permit this particular dis-
crimination. ,277 The court envisioned that by allowing the city to select
who will speak based on past constitutional speech, there would be an
overwhelming chilling effect on prospective speech.278
Second, the court stated that while time, place, and manner restric-
tions present a mechanism for restricting future speech, that speech must
always be prospective. 279 The amortization clause in the Somerville
ordinance based the determination of who could speak on past lawful
speech without notifying the speaker that he would be penalized for the
lawful speech 280 The court ruled that "Ackerley deserved notice that
a consequence of the decision to speak on less important, though consti-
tutionally protected subjects, would be the loss of its right ever to
display on its nonconforming signs the most highly valued mes-
sages." 28' Somerville's purpose for imposing this grandfather provi-
sion was to severely restrict nonconforming billboards.282 The court
held, however, that the grandfather clause was not a rational means
of attaining the purpose and that there were several less restrictive
alternatives available.283
274. Id. at 518 n.9.
275. Id. at 518.
276. Id. at 518-19.
277. Id. at 518.
278. Id. at 519-20.
279. Id. at 520.
280. Id. at 520-21.
281. Id. at 521-22.
282. Id. at 522.
283. Id.
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